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SPECIAL FOCUS: ANIMAL MODELS IN TISSUE ENGINEERING. PART II*
Ethical Issues in the Use
of Animal Models for Tissue Engineering:
Reflections on Legal Aspects, Moral Theory,
Three Rs Strategies, and Harm–Benefit Analysis
Gabriel R. Liguori, MD,1,2,** Bertus F. Jeronimus, PhD,3,4,** Ta´cia T. de Aquinas Liguori, DVM,1,2,**
Luiz Felipe P. Moreira, MD, PhD,2 and Martin C. Harmsen, PhD1
Animal experimentation requires a solid and rational moral foundation. Objective and emphatic decision-making
and protocol evaluation by researchers and ethics committees remain a difficult and sensitive matter. This article
presents three perspectives that facilitate a consideration of the minimally acceptable standard for animal ex-
periments, in particular, in tissue engineering (TE) and regenerative medicine. First, we review the boundaries
provided by law and public opinion in America and Europe. Second, we review contemporary moral theory to
introduce the Neo-Rawlsian contractarian theory to objectively evaluate the ethics of animal experiments. Third,
we introduce the importance of available reduction, replacement, and refinement strategies, which should be
accounted for inmoral decision-making and protocol evaluation of animal experiments. The three perspectives are
integrated into an algorithmic and graphic harm–benefit analysis tool based on the most relevant aspects of animal
models in TE. We conclude with a consideration of future avenues to improve animal experiments.
Keywords: animal experimentation, animal use alternatives, morals, research ethics, tissue engineering, reg-
ulatory aspects
In animal research, several questions arise that regardanimal rights and researcher responsibilities. Which con-
ditions are balancing the suffering and interests of animals
and humans? When do human interests outweigh animal
suffering? Animal research is bound by at least four dimen-
sions, including governmental legislation, which ultimately
reflects a public opinion, and is based on a moral stand and
available alternatives for the experiment. One way to sum-
marize a wide spectrum of views is the weak-to-strong human
priority dimension.1 A weak human priority position holds
that animal interests can outweigh human interest and influ-
ence whether an experiment is morally justifiable. The ex-
treme pole is a belief in abolition of animal use on moral and
ethical grounds. A strong human priority position holds that
human interests always prevail, but that animal interests may
influence how an experiment is done. The extreme pole is a
belief in free rein on the use of animals in research and testing.
Nowadays most people take a middle ground.
The weak-to-strong human priority dimension may also
underlie the purposes for which one deems animal experi-
mentation justifiable. Is it used to only derive new health-
oriented knowledge regarding life-threatening diseases (weak
priority position), or also to gain fundamental knowledge
(strong priority position)? The general public often is more
compelled to justify animal experiments to investigate life-
threatening diseases than nonlife-threatening diseases.2–4
Most people agree with experiments on allegedly uncon-
scious species (e.g., worms and flies), but experiments on
more or less self-conscious species (i.e., mammals such as
rodents, pigs, and primates) receive less support, as self-
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consciousness may implymore and different interests.2–7 The
decision to use animals in research requires critical thought,
judgment, and analysis, and such questions are a key focus of
moral philosophy.
Gandhi argued that the greatness of a nation and its moral
progress can be judged by the way its animals are treated.
Governmental legislation is the most explicit boundary of
animal research and may be understood as solidified societal
opinions. Regulatory authorities tend to restrict institutional
and researcher responsibilities to harness the possible harm,
pain, distress, and disease that may follow animal manipu-
lation.8,9 Paradoxically, most modern countries also ruled
that new drugs and consumer products require assessment
for safety in animal models (e.g., vaccine testing and lethal
dose tests) before introduction.10,11 Despite progress on this
topic, annually >120 million research animals suffer from
treatments that inflict serious damage and harm from such
experiments around the world.12
Animal experiments are further constrained by societal
acceptance, which influences the kinds of research that is
supported by public money.8 Societal acceptance pertains to
both the research question and the kind and species of animal
that is involved. For example, many people feel that com-
panion animals such as dogs have a different moral status than
pigs, rats, or fishes, as little exposure to these species makes it
easier to ignore questions about their treatment.13 Both leg-
islation and moral evaluation of protocols regarding ethical
treatment of animal experiments are also guided by the
principles of replacement, reduction, and refinement (the
three Rs or 3Rs), as first described by Russell and Burch in
1959.14 In vitro testing through use of, for example, waste
samples from human surgery such as tumors and unsuitable
organ transplants and computational modeling methods be-
come increasingly more efficient and are preferable alterna-
tives to animal experiments. However, hitherto the 3Rs
cannot replace all animal experiments,15 and experiments
remain a key part of modern life sciences. This article,
therefore, provides three perspectives that facilitate to con-
template and guide the implementation of the minimally ac-
ceptable rational standards for animal experimentation:
(1) The legal boundaries of animal experiments in Eur-
ope and the United States, which reflect the reigning
societal norms and values.
(2) The Neo-Rawlsian ‘‘veil of ignorance’’ heuristic in
moral theory, which may help to objectively evaluate
animal experiments.
(3) The available 3Rs strategies.
The three perspectives are lately integrated into an algo-
rithmic and graphic harm–benefit analysis tool to counter-
balance expected human benefits (including the translational
potential of the study) against the expected animal harm. This
tool can be used to derive a crude and easy advice about the
minimally acceptable standard for animal experiments to be
carried out with care, integrity, and responsibility.
Legal Boundaries for Animal Experiments
in Developed Countries
The privilege to use animals in research is a societal trust
that mandates responsible and humane care and use of these
animals.16 Animal experiments are constrained by laws,
regulations, and government policies. The European Union
(EU) enshrined animal welfare as a core value in Article 13 of
their Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU). Animal experiments for scientific and educational
purposes are regulated by directive 2010/63/EU (which for-
mally replaced directive 86/609/EEC in 201317), which re-
quires member states to harmonize their national legislation
regarding animal experiments. Directive 2010/63/EU pro-
tects animals and mammalian fetuses in their last trimester,
independently feeding larval forms, and live cephalopods
(article 1.3), and prescribes minimum standards for their
housing and care, and a systematic project evaluation that
assesses animal pain, suffering, distress, and lasting harm due
to the experiments. All these unpleasant mental states can be
subsumed under the general category of distress experiences,
which the 3Rs aim to eliminate or minimize.15 Directive
2010/63/EU refers to the 3Rs directly (article 4), and requires
member states to promote alternative methods, and organizes
reference laboratories focused on the validation of alternative
methods to replace animal testing (article 47-2).
Because directive 2010/63/EU excludes invertebrates,
>90% of all animal species lack coverage,18 including the
insect clade, which is popular for experiments on insect cy-
borg drones.19 However, insects also have brains and a life
agenda (i.e., they show behavior such as eating and procre-
ation), and appear to have the capacity for minimal subjec-
tive experience,20 including pain.18,21 Insects are able to
manipulate objects with a specific goal in mind,22 which is a
hallmark of cognitive complexity. So, this exclusion of in-
vertebrate animal phyla from even the most minimal pro-
tection (with the exception of cephalopods) exemplifies a
divide in the distribution of consciousness that requires a ra-
tional justification grounded in moral theory. Importantly,
outside of the EU (including the Americas), even most ver-
tebrate animal species lack protection, as outlined hereunder.
The U.S. federal legislation governing animal use in re-
search and entertainment is called the Animal Welfare Act
(AWA, 1966), which expanded in scope through several
amendments between 1970 and 2002. The AWA defines an-
imals as nonhuman members of five vertebrate classes, sorted
over warm-blooded animals (mammals and birds) and cold-
blooded animals (reptiles, amphibians, and fish). The AWA
applies to experiments with all warm-blooded animals, thus
live or dead dog, cat, primate, guinea pig, hamster, and rabbit
(Laboratory Animal Welfare Act 1970, P.L. 91-579), which
accumulates to almost 800 million animals annually, ac-
cording to the Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHI, 2016 re-
port). However, cold-blooded animals (reptiles/fish/amphib-
ians), invertebrates, and, most importantly, all rats, mice, and
birds bred for research (!), as well as farm animals raised for
food or used in agricultural research (e.g., cows and pigs) are
explicitly excluded from AWA coverage, altogether these
groups represent no <95% of the research animals used in the
United States alone (www.neavs.org). Although the federal
Public Health Service Policy on the Humane Care and Use of
Laboratory Animals covers animals in research funded by the
National Institute of Health (NIH, see OLAW.nih.gov), it
only provides policy recommendations (rather than require-
ments) and relies on voluntary application and self-report.
And the AWA does not require laboratories to report upon
their non-AWA protected animals.























































The Food Security Act of 1985 (P.L., 99-198) prescribes
minimum requirements for physical and psychological well-
being of primates and dogs and research practices that
minimize their pain and stress (cf. 3Rs). Pain is defined as
discomfort resulting from injury or disease, whereas distress
results from pain, anxiety, or fear. Besides its physical as-
pect, pain may also be psychosomatic, for example, as the
result from emotional distress. To date, a single dog or
primate may not be used in more than one major operative
experiment without proper recovery time.9 Nonetheless, the
United States remains among the few developed countries
that continues large-scale use of nonhuman primates such as
chimpanzees for experiments in federal research laborato-
ries (including the NIH). This practice is strictly limited or
banned in Europe, Japan, and New Zealand.9(p.9)
The AWA reflects a strong human priority position as most
animals are exempted from even themostminimal protection.
The underlying resistance to accept that rats, mice, and birds
have an inherent value and may have complex emotional
capacities (including love, compassion, disappointment, and
nostalgia) may partly be explained by professional and fi-
nancial interests in animal experimentation.23,24 Moreover,
the AWA does not prescribe the use of valid alternatives to
animal models, even if these are available, despite that re-
search animals display distress signals, and attempts to dis-
continue the experiments.7,24 This illustrates how difficult
objective and emphatic decision-making and protocol eval-
uation of animal experiments remain for researchers and
ethics committees.
The Canadian Council on Animal Care (CCAC) is respon-
sible for ‘‘setting, maintaining, and overseeing the im-
plementation of high standards for animal ethics and care in
science throughout Canada.’’25 Animal experiments are gov-
erned by jurisdiction of the provinces, but federal regulations
protect animals in general (Criminal Code 444 to 447).26 And
research institutes can only receive federal funding or contracts
if they are CCAC certified.27,28 Also, the Canadian Food In-
spection Agency (CFIA) imposes constraints through (1) the
Requirements forNon-Human Primates Imported intoCanada,
(2) the Veterinary Biologics Guideline, and (3) the Contain-
ment Standards for Facilities Handling Aquatic Animal Pa-
thogens. The first regulates the importation of nonhuman
primates,29 the second regulates the research facilities and
veterinary supervision,29,30 and the third regulates the use of
fish in research, teaching, and testing.
In Japan, animal experimentation is mainly regulated by
the Law for the Humane Treatment and Management of
Animals and the Standards Relating to the Care and Man-
agement, and Alleviation of Pain and Distress of Experi-
mental Animals.31,32 Besides that, guidelines by several
ministries and institutional rules are also applicable.31 The
Law for the Humane Treatment and Management of Ani-
mals states first that ‘‘all people are required not only to
avoid purposeless killing, injuring, and afflicting animals,
but also to treat animals properly while taking the need for
symbiosis between people and animals and the natural
habits of animals into account’’ and, then, that ‘‘where an
animal is used for the purposes of education, testing, man-
ufacture of biological products, or other scientific purposes,
it shall be so used by methods that cause the animal mini-
mum pain and distress possible within the limits imposed by
the purposes.’’ Through all the law, the 3Rs strategies are
strongly stimulated and required.32 The Standards Relating
to the Care and Management, and Alleviation of Pain and
Distress of Experimental Animals, in turn, divide animal
in four categories (pet animals, zoo animals, farm animals,
and experimental animals) and provide standards for each
category.31 The standard for experimental animals states
that although the ‘‘usage of animals for scientific purpose is
necessary and indispensable for the advancement of bio-
medical science and the development of medical technology
(.) the 3Rs should be considered when animals are used for
scientific purposes.’’ The standard also requires the following
practices: (1) consider good experimental procedures, (2)
appropriate usage of animals, (3) purposeful experimental
procedures, (4) administration of anesthetics and analgesics,
(5) shorter duration of procedures, (6) minimize pain and
distress, and (7) euthanasia with overdose of anesthetics.31
The use of animal models in Australia is dictated by the
animal ethics committees (AECs), which are bodies inside
each institution, but that can also be shared by more than one
institution, responsible ‘‘to ensure, on behalf of institutions,
that all care and use of animals is conducted in compliancewith
theCode.’’ TheCode, in turn, is theAustralianCodeof Practice
for the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes, a
governmental act that regulates animal experimentation.33
Thus, researchers respond to their own institution AEC and the
AECs are responsible to warranty that the researches comply
with the Code. As well as the Japanese Standards, the Aus-
tralian Code seeks to ensure that animal use is justified and that
the 3Rs are respected. InNewZealand, animal experimentation
is regulated by the Animal Welfare Act 1999, a code that,
similar towhat happens inAustralia, guides institutionalAECs.
The Animal Welfare Act 1999, just as the Japanese and the
Australian legislations, also embodies the 3Rs principles.34 On
2015, the New Zealand Parliament passed the AnimalWelfare
Amendment Act (No. 2) 2015, which includes an amendment
to the Animal Welfare Act 1999, recognizing animals as sen-
tient and banning cosmetic testing.35
The protection of research animals in developing coun-
tries is typically less well regulated and may result in much
worse animal welfare conditions than in other parts of the
world.36
Contemporary Moral Theory and the Neo-Rawlsian
Veil of Ignorance
About 5000 years ago, in Classical Antiquity, theorists
conveyed that all animals shared their origin and that all
emotions in the psyche were inborn in all animals alike and
were seated in the heart or gut.37–39 Humans were thought
to have differentiated themselves from animals over time,
when they had established rulers, laws, crafts, and cities.
About 2400 years ago, early Greek physician-scientists, in-
cluding Aristotle, Erasistratus, and Galen, experimented on
living animals to advance their understanding of anatomy,
physiology, pathology, and pharmacology, and to test sur-
gical procedures before application on humans.40 During
the past 2000 years, the Hebrew bible* and Descartes (1637)
*‘‘Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth and subdue it:
and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the
air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.’’ Hebrew
Bible, Genesis 1:28, God’s first words to Adam and Eve.























































introduced the perspective of animals as clockworks without
a soul in which to feel pleasure and pain,41 which supports a
strong human priority position.
In the 17th century, the legislation of Ireland (1635) and
the North-American Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641)
included animal welfare laws against tyranny or cruelty
toward domestic animals, such as pulling wool off living
sheep. Bentham (1789) was among the first who seriously
considered animal rights based on a moral theory he called
utilitarianism.42 In the utilitarian approach, morally good
actions promote or produce the greatest amount of intrin-
sically valuable things (i.e., pleasure, happiness, or satis-
faction of desires, whatever those preferences may be). The
outcomes determine the morality of the intervention. This
led Bentham to conclude that the crucial question regarding
animals is not whether they can talk or reason, but whether
they can suffer. In the 19th century, Darwin and Wallace
(1858) revived the idea that all animals shared their ori-
gin39,43 and showed that differences in desires, experiences,
and faculties between species (human and other animals) are
one of degree rather than kind.44 This shifted public per-
spective and resulted in the British Cruelty to Animals Act
in 1876, the first law specifically aimed at regulating animal
testing.
Over the course of the 20th century, the number of ani-
mals used for experimentation increased significantly, lar-
gely driven by the development of new drugs.10,11 Singer
(1975) put the cat among the pigeons when he extended
utilitarian moral theory to animals, and concluded that ex-
periments on mammals and birds for scientific and commer-
cial purposes were immoral, because refusal to givemammals
and birds equal consideration was a form of bias called
‘‘speciesism’’ (i.e., discrimination between species on the
basis of morally irrelevant characteristics45). Regan (1983)
invoked the natural rights doctrine to argue that animals
possess an inherent value (an objective property) that humans
are morally obliged to respect and that requires us to treat
animals accordingly.46 Because mammals and birds have
perception, memory, emotional lives, desires, beliefs, and a
sense of future, Regan argued, they were ‘‘subjects-of-a-life’’
(cf. Refs.23,24). According to Regan, subjects-of-a-life have
the right not to be harmed, whereas the ‘‘respect principle’’
makes it immoral to harm or sacrifice these individuals for the
greater good of the community.
Most clinicians and researchers are intuitive utilitarians
who aim to maximize overall utility but also argue that the
basic principle of equality dictates them to treat all indi-
viduals with equal consideration and respect.5 Therefore, the
crucial question becomes who counts as an individual (only
human persons?), as this subsequently influences what is
meant with ‘‘maximum utility’’ (for whom?). This principle
of equal consideration is a cornerstone in contemporary
moral thinking and roots in the social contract tradition, in
which Hobbes (1651) introduced the heuristic of a hypo-
thetical bargaining situation (the ‘‘state of nature’’),
henceforth the ‘‘original position.’’47 In this original situa-
tion, social contractors use their rational self-interest to
negotiate a social contract or mutual agreement that is the
source of moral code and duties. Adherence to this contract
involves accepting restrictions upon one’s freedom that al-
low one to obtain goods that outweigh the value of the
freedoms lost (e.g., safety, health, or knowledge). These
ideas enclose the fundamental principles of autonomy and
informed consent.
Early contractarians excluded nonhuman animals from
this moral sphere because they could not be contract partners,
after all, they pose little threat to humans (violation of the
equality of power condition) and were not rational agents that
could understand the terms of the contract, thus could not
reciprocate.5 Consequently, they lacked moral status, and,
therefore, moral rights and entitlements. Thus, we have no
moral duties or otherwise toward them. However, more re-
cently, Kant’s (1785) notion of a moral law transformed the
contractarian heuristic into a way to derive a general theory of
morality.48 Theorists reasoned that because humans are not
rational agents as infants and will probably neither be rational
in the last years of their lives (or earlier, due to illness or
accidents), a choice for a moral system that makes no provi-
sions for the nonrational is irrational, provided that one day
we nearly certainly will be among them.5 Rawls (1971),
therefore, revived contractarianism by introducing the heu-
ristic of a veil of ignorance at the original position.49
Rawls realized that the rules in a ‘‘social contract’’ would
be more impartial and objective when discussants could
consider all perspectives without personal biases and prej-
udices, by being unaware of their particular social, racial,
economic, and gender characteristics, natural talents, abili-
ties, and tastes, among others.49 In Rawls’ thought experi-
ment, all arbitrary properties (including intellect, rationality,
and species membership) become excluded behind a veil of
ignorance5 when discussants deliberate how the world
should work (at the ‘‘original position’’), which enables
them to derive a ‘‘reflective equilibrium’’ in which all in-
terests of all members of a society are optimally balanced.5
Rawls theory of justice38 holds that (1) one is not morally
entitled to benefits that accrue from properties one has done
nothing to earn or merit (‘‘equality of opportunity princi-
ple’’), (2) everybody should enjoy the maximum liberty
possible without limiting the freedom of others (‘‘liberty
principle’’), and (3) inequalities in distribution of goods
(including responsibilities and power) are permissible only
if they benefit the least well-of positions in a society
(‘‘difference principle’’). Rawls’ principles and the intuitive
equality argument culminate in a Neo-Rawlsian moral the-
ory in which the veil of ignorance is key.
Rowlands’5 recent review of moral theory behind animal
experiments concluded that currently no morally relevant
difference between humans and other vertebrates has been
articulated that can justify the claim that humans are morally
entitled (and must, therefore, be treated with consideration
and respect) and other vertebrates are not. These distinctions
have been either morally arbitrary (such as genotype, phe-
notype, or intelligence) or failed to pass the argument from
marginal cases. This marginal cases argument holds that if
some animals score higher on an invoked characteristic than
some humans—one may think of intellect or rationality,
such as in newborns, severely mentally disabled children,
people in a persistent vegetative state, or those suffering
from advanced states of dementia—this would mean that
these humans also forgo their moral status, which most
people find unacceptable.5,50 The logic conclusion is that
humans and nonhuman animals should receive the same
consideration when deciding on a just distribution of costs
and benefits (the ‘‘no human priority position’’).























































Inclusion of nonhuman vertebrates in the utilitarian cal-
culus or natural rights doctrine leaves no moral ground for
experiments on vertebrates.5 Also moral theory based on
Neo-Rawlsian contractarianism provides no moral-ethical
ground for animal research, except if arguments can be
formulated that overturn the intuitive equality principle—
which would revoke the exclusion of specific properties
such as being a nonhuman animal from behind the veil of
ignorance. The liberty and difference principles can only
support animal research that provides the greatest benefit to
the least-advantaged members of society, and an example in
which a human benefit can outweigh the associated animal
suffering is difficult to conceive.
From a moral stance, Neo-Rawlsian contractarianism
seems the only rational and pragmatic approach to guide
contemporary ethical decision-making regarding animal
experiments, as it provides an objective framework to guide
choices regarding animal experiments from behind the veil
of ignorance. The morality of animal experiments can be
determined by identifying which members of each category
of species involved stand to gain and lose from such choi-
ces, which can be integrated in a simplified form in a de-
cision matrix (Figs. 1 and 2). In keeping with the difference
principle, a greater share of resources could be claimed if
benefit is gained compared with those who have lesser
shares.5 For example, animal suffering in return for new or
better treatments for humans with a life-threatening disease.
Theoretically, this approach could thus lead to harm to some
individuals while the net outcome is maximum benefit.
Admittingly, in practice, our decision matrix is still closer to
a utilitarian calculus with a weak human priority position
(in which a higher utility is ascribed to the well-being of
humans and lower utility to the well-being of nonhuman
animals), as it is difficult to imagine how these animals—as
the least-advantaged members of society—could benefit from
such experiments (as required by the difference principle).
3Rs Strategies in Tissue Engineering
The principle of 3Rs strategies guided the ethical treat-
ment of animal experiments over the past five decades.14
Replacement strategies have successfully been applied in
biological science domains, including toxicology and drug
testing studies.51 However, replacement is of limited use to
tissue engineering (TE), as physiologically meaningful al-
ternatives to test three-dimensional structures are limited.52
FIG. 1. Flowchart of the harm–benefit analysis algorithm. Definitions of the expected human benefit and expected animal
harm categories can be found in Table 2. Translational gap evaluation questionnaire and score can be found in Table 3.























































TE is an emerging field in biomedical engineering that aims
to generate new biological material for replacing diseased or
damaged tissues or organs, such as skin (*10% of the body
mass).52 Nonetheless, reduction and refinement strategies
can and should be explored to guarantee ethical animal
experiments in the TE domain.
Reduction refers to methods that minimize the number of
animals used per study without compromising the power
of the experiment.14 The reduction principle includes both
determining the optimal number of animals required to
achieve reliable and reproducible results using only the most
optimal animal model available. Although the number of
animals required should be clear cut, because it is the con-
sequence of statistical power analysis, it is common practice
that researchers do not discuss how they reached the chosen
sample size.53 In contrast, the selection of the appropriate
and optimal animal model is more challenging to tackle than
sample size, but no less important. Pivotal is that the animal
model should accurately represent human physiology or
disease or at least part of it. One approach is a favor step-
wise procedure, in which models that employ small animals
are used first, followed by larger animal models as a means
to reduce the total number of animals in use.1,54 Para-
doxically, other researchers argued against this stepwise
approach, posing exactly the opposite perspective.6 They
state that many animal models lack predictive value, be-
cause results cannot readily be translated to other animals
(including humans), thus after initial success the same ex-
periment must, therefore, be repeated in a better and more
predictive model. Accordingly, the number of animals can
be reduced when only those models representative of the
human scenario are selected. This comparability argument
also favors studies that use the same optimal animal model,
as this enables for a more accurate assessment of the vari-
ability in outcomes.6
Although there are several experiments that only mar-
ginally contribute to future human benefit, only a few have
vast implications to the clinic. One powerful rule could be
the Pareto principle, which states that for many events
roughly 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes.55
The Pareto principle is vastly used in many areas of the
knowledge, from business to epidemiology, and can also be
applied to biological sciences, in particular to the reduction
principle in animal experimentation. Using the Pareto
principle, many businesses dramatically improved their
profitability by focusing on the most effective areas and
eliminating, ignoring, automating, delegating, or retraining
the rest, as appropriate.55 By analogy, if we distinguish and
focus on the 20% of the experiments that bring the 80% of
the clinical applications, we could drastically reduce the
number of animal experiments without losing much of their
benefits. In the A New Tool for the Harm–Benefit Analysis
in TE section, we describe a new tool for the harm–benefit
analysis in TE, which might help researchers to come closer
to this 20% optimal fraction of the experiments.
Refinement, the last R, refers to the actions that lead to
reduce to an absolute minimum the amount of suffering and
distress imposed on those animals that still need to be
used.14 There has been an exponential growth in the use of
analgesics and other modalities for controlling pain and
distress in research protocols,8 which, next to a necessity to
reduce the number of animals to a minimal possible, has
apparently also been mastered by researchers. Today, re-
finement pertains the translational gap between animal
models and human application, or the differences between
the results found in animal models and those shown in
human patients54 pathogenesis and immune responses are
frequently species specific. It is obvious that an appropriate
translation to clinical disease requires suitable animals,
which depends on species, environment, and experimental
setup. If these criteria are met, it adds to refinement, and
animal harm will be kept to a minimum.
As outlined, it is quintessential to optimize the animal
model to adequately represent human disease, which in-
cludes to identify the optimal species that does not depend
on size per se. It is imperative to consistently and conse-
quently apply the optimal model throughout (series) of in-
terrelated experiments. Besides the choice of a species in
animal experiments, it is also important to develop a model
in which untreated animals will recover in the same manner
FIG. 2. Graphic representation of the algo-
rithmic harm–benefit analysis. All the scenar-
ios above the translational gap line support
carrying out the study, while all the scenarios
below the translational gap line oppose the
study to be carried out. Black, strongly sup-
ports carrying out the study; dark gray, sup-
ports carrying out the study; medium gray,
translational gap analysis must be performed;
light gray, opposes the study to be carried out;
white, strongly opposed to the study being
carried out.























































as the clinical presentation. It is also of great value to match
type and anatomy of the animal model graft implantation
site to the planned for clinical application, for example, if
the objective of the study is to analyze a vascular graft for
the use as coronary artery bypass graft, it is not adequate to
implant the tissue-engineered blood vessel (TEBV) in any
venous territory or even in a different arterial territory than
the coronaries.
Also, the gender and age of the animal model require
consideration, as outcomes may be influenced by hormonal
differences and senescence.56,57 Most researchers use young
animals that manifest a much higher repair capacity that
may override the repair strategy under evaluation, while
many human diseases are predominantly age related. Fur-
thermore, most animal studies use acute damage, that is,
focus on suddenly created defects that are immediately
treated with the TE construct, whereas the majority of the
patients have a long history of chronic diseases before they
are treated. It is, therefore, important to create animal
models of chronic diseases to cross the translational gap
between animal models and TE application.
Taken together, the refinement of animal models re-
mains a challenge. Importantly, evidence-based choices for
a particular animal model shall yield results that prove more
representative for the human situation, which both im-
proves translation to the clinic and saves superfluous animal
experiments.
TE as a 3Rs strategy
Hitherto, TE-based research still results in suffering and
loss of animal lives, but it has also a great potential for
the development of alternatives to animal experiments for
multiple research fields.51,52 First, TE-based constructs
can be modeled to present a three-dimensional structure
that allows researchers to investigate interactions between
cells and between cells and extracellular matrix to mention a
few. Second, it is possible to use human cells, which enables
to translate findings better to human (patho)physiology.
Moreover, when cells of patients are used, artificial models
for diseased can be generated and used, for example, to as-
sess drugs. Finally, TE constructs are developed in a con-
trolled manner and are, therefore, much less influenced by
confounding factors (and biases) than animal models.
The potential of TE technology to replace animal models
for several tissue types has been shown in pharmacological,
physiological, and pathophysiological studies,51 and com-
panies already created commercially available tissue models
for animal replacement (Table 1), mostly dedicated to drug
testing. Currently, most of the TE animal experiment re-
placement strategies are based on the use of skin tissue for
toxicological tests,51 and at least 16 brands of artificial skin
are commercially available (Table 1). The prime reasons for
the success of TE skins are their relatively simple structure
compared with more complex organ tissues (such as vas-
cularized parenchymal tissues) and their commercial value
after legislation banned animal experiments for testing
cosmetic products, resulting in substantial investments and
efforts from corporations such as L’Ore´al.58
Other uses of TE constructs to replace animal models
include drug-oriented toxicology tests in other epithelial
barriers, such as cornea,59–63 oral64,65 and intestinal muco-
sa,19,66–68 and lung air–liquid interface.69,70 The corneal
epithelium is the second most studied TE alternative to
animal models, just behind TE skin tissue, due to two main
reasons: (1) many corneal epithelium models are adapta-
tions of the skin models51 and (2) the legislation regulat-
ing animal experiments for testing cosmetic products
applies also to the eye irritancy testing (or Draize Test)
performed in animal models, usually rabbits.71 Fortunately,
TE cornea epithelium is extensively described in the liter-
ature59–63 and commercially available under four different
brands (Table 1).
Shifting focus to another type of tissue, most drugs are
administered orally, thus knowledge on the absorption and
metabolic mechanisms in the gastrointestinal barriers (e.g.,
oral and intestinal mucosa) is essential, which still requires
in vivo experiments. Although some TE alternatives ex-
ist19,66–68 and are commercialized (Table 1), none is com-
pletely able to simulate the in vivo environment, particularly
the microbiota and immune system roles.72 Oral mucosa,
however, can also be used for biocompatibility testing—of
great importance in the dentistry field—and shows promis-
ing alternatives in the short term, being not only commer-
cialized (Table 1) but also proved to be useful for testing
bonding adhesives,73 orthodontic wires,74,75 and dental
composite resins.76 Engineered airway epithelium, in turn,
represents an important alternative for researchers, industry,
and regulatory agencies. Researchers might benefit of
in vitro lung models for drug development or pathophysio-
logical studies, whereas the tobacco and chemical industries
urge for toxicity testing alternatives for their products, and
regulatory agencies might use them for controlling air quality
and ensure standards for pollution-producing vehicles and
machines. For that purpose, besides some three-dimensional
lung tissue cultures developed by researchers,69,70 five alter-
natives of TE air–liquid interface models are already com-
mercially available (Table 1).
Parenchymal organs, such as the heart,77–81 liver,82–88 and
even the brain,89,90 are also being engineered, at the tissue
level, as alternatives to animal models. Owing to the high
prevalence of heart diseases, the cardiovascular field had
always been the most prominent area in TE. Although car-
diac patches are still not available to clinicians, the persis-
tent effort to create them enabled for the creation of in vitro
cardiac models.71 The use of these models was already
shown not only to pathophysiology79 and pharmacological
testing78,80,81 but also for gene therapy.77 Drug development
not only requires understanding effects in gastrointestinal
barriers but also knowledge of its liver toxicity, a major
issue related to drug development failure.71 Several alter-
natives of liver tissue for in vitro testing have been developed.
Most of them using more traditional TE techniques,82,83 in-
cluding three-dimensional models for assessment of tissue
response to drug-induced toxicity.84–87 Currently, there are
commercially available alternatives to liver tissue in the
market (Table 1). Recently, cerebral organoids have been
created, which showed the ability to display discrete brain
regions.89 Similar organoids were already used to demon-
strate effects of viral infection in a complex brain tissue,90
something that, before, could only be done in animal models.
A limitation of tissue-engineered constructs compared with
animals is the lack of perfusion, that is, the lack of vascula-
ture. Therefore, replacement tissues are size limited by the























































diffusion limits of oxygen and nutrients. In contrast, organ-
on-a-chip systems (vessels on a chip, lung on a chip, or, e.g.,
kidney on a chip) aremuch smaller scale and perfusable, yet lack
the complex organization of the parenchyma of the full-blown
organs. This is discussed in the next paragraph. Taken together,
this field is developing exponentially and will certainly strongly
contribute to refined models and reduce animal use.
TEBVs can also substitute animal models in several sit-
uations, including drug testing and during the develop-
ment of endovascular devices, such as catheters and stents.
Regarding drug testing, TEBVs could be used for better
understanding mechanisms of drugs that are target for the
vascular tissue and also for studying the adverse effects
of other drugs on the vascular function. Different studies
Table 1. Commercially Available Tissue Models for Animal Replacement
Mimicked tissue Manufacturer Commercial name Cell types
Skin MatTek Corporation EpiDerm HEK
EpiDermFT HEK and HDF
MelanoDerm HEK and HM
EPISKIN, L’Ore´al EpiSkin HEK
RHE SkinEthic HEK
RHPE SkinEthic HEK and HM
Cell Systems epiCS HEK
epiCS-M HEK and HM
J-TEC, Fujifilm Group LabCyte EPI-MODEL HEK
Stratatech, Mallinckrodt StrataTest NIKS
Henkel Phenion FT Skin Model HEK and HDF
Biomimiq FDM HEK
FTM HEK and HDF
LEM HEK
ATERA ATERA-RHE HEK
ATERA-RHPE HEK and HM
Cornea MatTek Corporation EpiCorneal HCEC
EpiOcular HEK
EPISKIN, L’Ore´al HCE SkinEthic Immortalized HCEC
J-TEC, Fujifilm Group LabCyte CORNEA-MODEL HCEC
ATERA ATERA-RHC CCL20.2 cell line
Oral mucosa MatTek Corporation EpiOral HOK differentiated into noncornified
buccal phenotype
EpiGingival HOK differentiated into cornified
gingival phenotype
EPISKIN, L’Ore´al HOE SkinEthic TR146 cell line
HGE SkinEthic HGEC
ATERA ATERA-RHO TR146 cell line
ATERA-RHG Human-derived gingival mucosal cells
Intestinal mucosa MatTek Corporation EpiIntestinal HSIE
ATERA ATERA-RHC T84 cell line
Lung air–liquid
interface
Epithelix Sa`rl MucilAir HAEC
MucilAir—HF HAEC and HAF
SmallAir HSAEC
SmallAir—HF HSAEC and HAF
MatTek Corporation EpiAirway HBE
Liver Ascendance Biotechnology HepatoPac HH and stromal cells
HepatoMune HH, HH-NPC, and Kupffer cells
CN Bio Innovations LiverChip HH, HH-NPC, and Kupffer cells
Organovo ExVive Human Liver Tissue HH, HHSC, and endothelial cells
Kidney Organovo ExVive Human Kidney
Tissue
Primary HRPTEC, HRF, and
endothelial cells
Vaginal MatTek Corporation EpiVaginal HEC differentiated into noncornified
vaginal-ectocervical phenotype
EPISKIN, L’Ore´al HVE SkinEthic A431 cell line
ATERA ATERA-RHV A431 cell line
HAEC, human airway epithelial cells; HAF, human airway fibroblasts; HBE, human tracheal/bronchial epithelial cells; HCEC, human
corneal epithelial cells; HDF, human dermal fibroblasts; HEC, human ectocervical cells; HEK, human-derived epidermal keratinocytes;
HGEC, human gingival epithelial cells; HH, human hepatocytes; HHNPC, human hepatic nonparenchymal cells; HHSC, human hepatic
stellate cells; HM, human melanocytes; HOK, human oral keratinocytes; HRF, human renal fibroblasts; HRPTEC, human renal proximal
tubule epithelial cells; HSAEC, human small airway epithelial cells; HSIE, human small intestinal epithelial cells; NIKS, near-diploid
neonatal human keratinocyte cell line.























































already showed the use of TEBVs for analyzing the vaso-
active response to different drugs.91–93 Furthermore, drugs
that require parenteral administration also need to have their
drug-induced vascular injury evaluated.94 Endovascular
devices development, in turn, requires knowledge regarding
biocompatibility, thrombogenesis, and endothelialization to
guarantee the safety and efficacy of these devices. For this
purpose, there are already studies showing the feasibility of
TEBVs as an evaluation method for endovascular devices.95–98
Two promising novel technologies add even more
potential to the use of TE as an alternative to animal ex-
perimentation: three-dimensional bioprinting and organ-on-
a-chip. Bioprinting is a process that aims to deposit cells
suspended in polymeric hydrogels onto a substrate, in a
layer-by-layer manner, to build three-dimensional constructs
analogous to tissues or organs.99 Although relatively new,
bioprinting already presents a huge potential to address the
animal experimentation issue, what can be seen by the rising
of companies such as Organovo, which already produce
and sell bioprinted tissues for biomedical research (Table 1).
Organ-on-a-chip technology, in turn, consists of three-
dimensional microfluidic cell culture chips that simulate the
behavior of entire organs, particularly with regard to the
physiological functions,99,100 and can allow high-throughput
screenings for drug development. Currently, most of the
studies with this technology are limited to one or no more
than a few organ systems in each chip. It is expected,
however, that in the future a complete combination of all
human organ systems, maybe even including the immune
system, could be joined in a single chip, constituting the so
called human-on-a-chip. By reducing the animal testing
steps, both technologies—and others that might come—will
allow the identification of promising therapies at earlier
stages, and thus reduce the development time and costs for
new drugs, besides ending animal suffering.
A New Tool for the Harm–Benefit Analysis in TE
Three core issues should be considered to decide whether
a research proposal should be approved or not: (1) the im-
portance of the study objectives, (2) the probability of
achieving these results, and (3) the harm to animals. Dif-
ferent harm–benefit analyses protocols have been proposed
to help both investigators and ethics committees in project
designing and decision-making processes,101 but no strategy
specifically aimed at the TE field. In this article, we intro-
duce an algorithmic and graphic harm–benefit analysis tool
that incorporates most relevant topics to decide on the use of
animal models in TE. This tool is rooted in the harm–benefit
matrix proposed by Nordgren, which balances the impor-
tance of specific research objectives with the expected ani-
mal harms.1 Our matrix classifies three degrees of expected
human benefit (small/medium/large) and three degrees of
expected animal harm (mild/moderate/severe). Regarding
the probability of achieving a desired objective, we consider
that, in the field of TE, the choice for the right animal model
is key. Consequently, the Nordgren matrix was extended
with an evaluation of the translational gap of the animal
model as a final decision step.
Moreover, we included a possible advice for each scenario
in theNordgrenmatrix, which results in nine possibilities: one
scenario in which the study is strongly supported, two sce-
narios that support carrying out the study, versus three gray
zones that generate doubts, and two scenarios that oppose the
study, while one scenario strongly opposes the study. The
grading and balancing of expected human benefit and animal
harm were based on Nordgren’s work1 and the 2009 report of
the Expert Working Group on Severity Classification of
Scientific Procedures Performed on Animals,102 which also
provides specific examples for each category (as summarized
in Table 2). The overarching summary is that expected human
benefits range from increases in basic biological knowledge
or understanding of pathogenesis (small benefit) through new
or better treatments for nonlife-threatening diseases (medium
benefit) to new or better treatments for a life-threatening
disease (large benefit). Expected animal harm grades from
short-term mild effects (either through pain, suffering, or
distress) without significant impairment to well-being or
health (mild harm), through long-lasting mild or short-term
moderate effects, likely to cause moderate impairment of
well-being or health (moderate harm), to short-term severe or
long-lasting moderate effects, likely to cause severe impair-
ment of well-being or health (severe harm).
To solve the issue of gray zones, a third and final criterion
to evaluate the harm–benefit balance of a proposed project
was added, namely, a ‘‘probability of achievement’’ com-
ponent. This component has been part of previously pro-
posed dimensional models, including the Bateson’s cube,103
which was later modified for the EU directive 2010/63.17
The original version included the analysis of the ‘‘impor-
tance of research,’’ ‘‘likelihood of human benefit,’’ and
‘‘animal suffering.’’ The modified version substituted the
‘‘importance of research’’ component for what they called
‘‘human benefit’’ (2010/63/EU). As already mentioned,
the chosen animal model shapes the translational potential
of a preclinical study, and consequently the probability to
achieve a specific human benefit. This consideration led to
Table 2. Definition of the Grades of Expected
Human Benefit and Animal Harm
Grade Definition
Expected human benefit
Small Increased basic biological knowledge or
knowledge of a disease mechanism.
Medium New or better treatment for a
nonlife-threatening disease.
Large New or better treatment for a
life-threatening disease.
Expected animal harm
Mild Short-term mild pain, suffering, or
distress with no significant
impairment of the well-being or
general condition.
Moderate Short-term moderate pain, suffering,
or distress, or long-lasting mild
pain, suffering, or distress, likely
to cause moderate impairment of
the well-being or general condition.
Severe Severe pain, suffering, or distress, or
long-lasting moderate pain, suffering,
or distress, likely to cause severe
impairment of the well-being or
general condition.























































our third component, which is the evaluation of the trans-
lational gap between human clinical situation and the ani-
mal model, based on six study characteristics: (1) the animal
species involved, (2) animal recovering status, (3) graft
implantation site, (4) gender and age, (5) acute/chronic
disease match, and (6) previous evidence of translational
potential. Each of these characteristics must be analyzed by
answering a binary (yes or no) question, as listed in Table 3.
Each positive answer adds one point to the final score,
whereas the final question (regarding previous evidence of
translational potential) adds two points. A final score <4
opposes the study, whereas a score ‡4 supports carrying out
the study. The flowchart of the harm–benefit analysis al-
gorithm can be found in Figure 1, whereas a graphic rep-
resentation of our analysis tool is depicted in Figure 2.
Although ethics committees may use considerations
similar to those described by the proposed analysis tool, the
TE component is missing in previously described harm–
benefit analysis protocols. It would be of great value if both
investigators and ethics committees could use our tool for
the proposition and evaluation of research projects involving
animal experimentation in the TE field.
Finally, despite the scientifically rigorous and compre-
hensive background of the proposed harm–benefit analy-
sis tool, some limitations merit discussion. The prominent
role of the selected animal model may render it difficult to
achieve the minimum necessary conditions to meet all the
algorithm requirements in our analysis tool and, therefore,
the feasibility of conducting the proposed study. In addition,
the costs of ethically acceptable animal experiments may
rise, because the development of a proper animal model
takes time and money and may also be more expensive to
use than conventional alternatives. However, we believe
good science is made of judicious reasoning beyond prac-
tical convenience, as outlined in the section Contemporary
Moral Theory and the Neo-Rawlsian Veil of Ignorance, thus
difficulties regarding study design processes should not be
the main reason for not performing it or opting for an easier,
less ethical, solution. Finally, for practical reasons, our re-
view and tool include only the most salient, timely, and
important considerations for research decisions in the TE
field, which in the future may be extended and improved
with more fine-grained considerations.
Conclusion
The ultimate form of power over someone is the power to
inflict pain, that is, suffering, at will. However, possession of
this power should not be confused with the right to inflict
pain. Animal experimentation requires a solid and rational
moral foundation and an imaginable proportionate good
at the other end of the suffering. In this regard, we propose
the application of the Neo-Rawlsian moral theory during the
process of ethical evaluation of animal experiments and
the use of the proposed harm–benefit analysis tool as an easy
decision-making tool to evaluate most scenarios of animal
experimentation. Furthermore, we consider that, in the field
of TE, the refinement strategy, among the 3Rs, is the most
important and the one that can be easily and wisely applied.
Finally, we believe that TE brings more hope than suffering
to the animals used for experimentation.
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